I. Introduction
In abstract mechanism theory, the designer is often presumed able to create a direct mechanism in which each participant's reports its "type," revealing all the details of the participant's preferences as well as anything else the participant may know. In practice, these details can be so numerous that reporting them all is impractical.
For example, in the National Resident Matching Program, which places doctors into hospital residency programs (Roth and Peranson (1999) ), a hospital that interviews fifty candidates in the hopes of employing ten has a type that is a list of length approximately 1.3×10 10 ranking all of the subsets of size ten or less. In FCC Spectrum
Auction 73, completed in 2008 with the sale of 1,090 radio spectrum licenses, a type is a vector of approximate dimension 1.3×10 328 , listing values for every subset of licenses.
Such reports are far too lengthy to be practical.
There are two pure approaches to mitigating the length-of-report problem. The first is to simplify reporting by limiting the message space and the second uses dynamic reporting. The National Resident Matching Program uses the first strategy: it limits hospitals to report preferences in the form of a number of positions and a rank order listing of candidates. If a hospital has ten openings and interviews fifty candidates, it reports the number ten and a list of length fifty -a manageably small message.
This main innovation of this paper is the introduction and analysis of a new message space -the space of assignment messages -designed for practical use.
Assignment messages describe preferences indirectly as the value of a linear program with constraints that conform to particular structure. These messages are formulated for mechanism design problems in which participants regard the goods as substitutes. A further simplification to basic assignment messages is particularly useful for problems of allocating indivisible, substitutable goods. Such messages demand only integer quantities and limit the local rates of substitution between any two goods to be zero or one. This restriction ensures that an efficient allocation assigns integer quantities of each good to each participant.
This paper analyzes the properties of assignment messages and assignment exchanges, which are simplified direct Walrasian mechanisms in which participants may report only assignment messages. Assignment auctions are assignment exchanges with just one buyer or just one seller, so that the competitive bids come from just one side of the market. With basic assignment messages, the assignment exchange extends its namesake, the Shapley and Shubik (1972) assignment mechanism, in three main ways: it allows participants to trade multiple types of goods, to trade multiple units of each type of good, and to have dual roles, buying some goods and selling others.
The simplified message approach must be compared to the second pure approach to reducing communication, which eschews direct mechanisms in favor of dynamic ones with staged reporting of information (Nisan and Segal (2006) , Parkes (2005) ). With stage reporting, only partial information about a participant's type is revealed at each reporting stage. Examples of dynamic multi-product mechanisms include simultaneous ascending and descending auctions (eg, Ausubel (2007) ), in which bidders are asked to report supplies or demands at a sequence of announced prices. Since demands at some prices cannot be inferred from the reported information, this economizes on communications relative to a standard direct mechanism.
For the problem of general equilibrium with substitutable preferences, the most relevant dynamic mechanisms are the simultaneous ascending or descending multi-item auctions, which have used in a variety of applications involving radio spectrum, electricity, and natural gas (Milgrom (2004) ). When the goods for sale are substitutes and that participants bid myopically, various types of simultaneous ascending or descending auctions not only economize on communications but also, in certain cases, identify efficient or stable allocations or find minimum or maximum market-clearing prices (Kelso and Crawford (1982) , Gul and Stacchetti (2000) , Milgrom (2000) , Ausubel (2004) , Milgrom and Strulovici (2008) ).
Compared to the similar direct mechanisms, multi-product ascending and descending auctions suffer from high participant costs, long times-to-completion, imprecise computations, and difficulties of scheduling. Any multi-round, real-time process adds the cost of real-time bidding to the costs of preparing for the auction.
Increasing the frequency of rounds can reduce this time cost, but that both increases the risk of bidder error and reduces any advantage that dynamic mechanisms may have in allowing bidders to respond thoughtfully to emerging information. In current practice, dynamic auctions for gas and electricity take several hours to reach completion, while spectrum auctions take days, weeks, or even months. Such long times-to-completion cripple these mechanisms for the most time-sensitive markets, such as hour-ahead power markets, where only minutes are available to complete an exchange. Real ascending and descending auctions generally fail to identify exact market-clearing prices in finite time, because they change the direction of price increments only a finite number of times and because price increments are discrete. 2 Pricing errors tend to be most severe when there are many products being exchanged, because finding equilibrium prices then requires a time-consuming search of a high-dimensional price-space. Finally, in export markets where potential buyers may reside in a dozen or more different time zones, scheduling a convenient hour for real-time bidding may be impossible.
These four problems are avoided by direct mechanisms, including simplified direct mechanisms. The key challenge for implementing a usable direct mechanism is to design a simple message space with suitable properties. For some applications, one such property is that the mechanism should lead to integer allocations.
Basic assignment messages result in efficient allocations that are integer valued, but require the marginal rates of technical substitution to be everywhere zero or one. This strong restriction is surprisingly often a reasonable approximation for auction and exchange applications. For example, an electric utility delivering retail power to its customers might acquire wholesale power from generators at different locations, say A, B and C, but may be limited in its ability to utilize power from each source by its sourcespecific transmission capacities. When sufficient transmission capacity is available at source A, one unit of power from A can be substituted for one unit from any other source.
When it is not, an additional unit of power at A displaces zero units of other power from other sources. Similarly, a cereal maker may be able to substitute bushels of grain delivered today for bushels delivered tomorrow up to a limit imposed by its grain storage capacity, or it may substitute one metric ton of a particular type or grade of grain for one of another type within limits specified by production requirements. The same limited one-for-one substitution pattern is sometimes found among sellers as well, as when a manufacturer can deliver several versions of the same processed good in a total amount that is limited by the overall capacity of its factory. 3 Limited one-for-one substitution can be a useful approximation whenever lots differ only in attributes such as time and location of availability, grade, degree of processing, or delivery and contract terms.
By limiting messages to express limited one-for-one substitution, the basic assignment exchange enjoys two advantages compared to the general assignment exchange: messages are simpler and, if the quantities in each bid and constraint group are integers, then the resulting allocations are always integer-valued. 4 The integer allocation property can be important in some applications, such as ones where commodities are most efficiently shipped by the truck-or container-load. Even for goods like electric power, which in principle seem perfectly divisible, contracts are often denominated and traded in indivisible units, such as megawatts of power, so respecting integer constraints may sometimes be useful.
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General assignment messages extend the basic assignment messages by allowing participants to specify rates of technical substitution besides zero and one. For example, in markets for electric power, if the transmission losses in shipping power from A are higher than from B, then one unit of power at A displaces less than one unit from B -the rate of technical substitution is less than one, and general assignment messages can express that. Using basic assignment messages, a bidder can account for such 3 The National Resident Matching Program, with its fixed number of slots at each hospital, imposes onefor-one substitution but excludes resident wages from the process. An assignment auction could be suitable for that application, provided that wages are made endogenous. Crawford (2004) proposes a simultaneous ascending auction mechanism for the same application. 4 When bundles necessarily consist of integer quantities and goods are substitutes, a version of the limited one-for-one substitution property is implied (Gul and Stacchetti (1999) , Milgrom and Strulovici (2008) A simplification limits the messages used by a mechanism, and that can affect incentives and performance. In a general simplification, some message profiles may be equilibria of the simplified mechanism even though they were not equilibria in the original, extended mechanism. A tight simplification is one with the property that, for every profile of participant preferences, all of the full-information pure ε-Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also ε-Nash equilibria of the original mechanism (see Milgrom (2008) ). Assignment exchanges are tight simplifications of general Walrasian exchange mechanisms.
An important attribute of assignment messages is that they allow not only bids to buy or sell one of several different goods, but also "swap" bids. For example, in a securities market, a swap could link an offer to buy shares of stock with an offer to sell certain call options in a single bid group which specifies that the trade should takes place if and only if the net cost per share of the transaction does not exceed a participantspecified maximum. Such a linkage can be valuable, because it eliminates execution risk.
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Assignment messages can express directly only substitutable preferences, so it is perhaps surprising that the basic assignment exchange nevertheless has applications to some resource allocation problems involving complementary goods, for which package 6 Some traders call this "leg risk" because the danger is that one "leg" of a transaction is executed while the other is not.
exchange mechanisms might have been thought to be necessary. 7 See Milgrom (2007) for an introduction to the economic package allocation problem, Nisan (2006) for an analysis of some message spaces that might be used in package auctions, and Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2006) for a collection of related articles. in that way, each energy producer/capacity buyer can bid on the lot connecting its location to the root at D, so these participants can express their preferences accurately. A supplier who wishes to offer capacity on one of the single links AC or BC can do that using a swap -linked offers to buy and sell. For example, an offer to sell capacity on AC at a price of at least X is represented as a swap that links an offer to sell capacity on the AD lot with a bid to buy equal capacity on the CD lot at a price difference of at least X.
With the specified lots, both buyers and sellers can express preferences accurately. The theorems about assignment exchanges apply and imply that, despite complementarities and indivisible lots which are problematic in other settings, market-clearing prices exist.
A similar construction can be used in any acyclic network by identifying one node in each component of the graph as a root and expressing all lots in terms of flows from a node to a root. Demand need not be located only at the roots for this construction to work, but the demanded packages of links must lie in sequence on one side of the root. A potentially interesting example of distributed demand is in a market for landing slots at a busy airport.
Airlines with hub-and-spoke systems usually prefer to operate groups of landing slots within a short interval of time, so that delays for passengers with connecting flights can be minimized. Suppose that landing slots are discrete and labeled by their assigned times T. To express the airline's preferences using assignment messages, operate the exchange as if the lots in the auction were intervals of slots ( The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the assignment message space and reports three theorems about it. The first is that the assignment messages express only substitutable preferences. The second is that when all preferences are expressed by assignment messages, then the set of market-clearing prices is a non-empty, closed, convex sublattice. The third is that if all participants' preferences are expressed with basic assignment messages, then there is an efficient allocation using only integer quantities of all goods. Section III provides a partial converse to the these theorems. Assignment messages require that the constraints connecting different goods form a "tree." If that constraint is relaxed at all, then the first two conclusions of section II are no longer valid. Section IV is about tightness. Its main conclusion is that the assignment exchanges, as well as many further simplifications of these exchanges, are tight simplifications of a Walrasian mechanism. Section V discusses the connections between the assignment exchange mechanism, single product uniform price auctions, and the Vickrey auction. Section VI concludes with a discussion of steps to take the theory to applications.
II. Assignment Messages
Consider a resource allocation problem with goods indexed by 1,... A direct mechanism must specify a message space for describing n V . The assignment exchange determines n q by summing vectors j x for ( ) j J n ∈ , where j is the serial number of a bid and J(n) is the set of serial numbers for bids by bidder n.
An assignment message describes n V using a collection of bids and a set of constraints. 8 Each bid by bidder n is indexed by a serial number ( ) j J n ∈ and consists of a 5-tuple ( , , , , )
where k j identifies the type of product, v j identifies the "value" of the bid, 0 j ρ > identifies the "effectiveness" and the remaining two terms are lower and upper bounds on quantities: 0 j j l u ≤ ≤ . The role of the effectiveness coefficient, which is to allow arbitrary marginal rates of substitution within certain constraints, will be formalized shortly.
In addition to the bids, participant n's assignment message expresses constraints of two kinds. First are the single-product bid group constraints:
where nk T includes all singletons { } S j = for which j k k = and may include other subsets
For the singletons, { } 
Unlike the sets used in the single product group constraints, the sets 0 n S ∈ T may include bids on multiple products. Also, unlike the sums in (1), those in (2) are weighted sums, with weights equal to the effectiveness coefficients.
To simplify notation, we suppress the subscript n while we are analyzing the reports and preferences of a single bidder; the subscript will reappear later when we analyze allocations for multiple participants. Using the bids and constraints, bidder n's message is interpreted to report a value for any feasible bundle of products 1 ( ,..., ) K= as follows:
Because the vector ( , ) 0 q x ≡ satisfies all the constraints in (3), the zero bundle 0 q = is feasible. By a theorem of linear programming, the set of vectors q for which the problem is feasible is a closed, bounded, convex set K Q ⊆ ℜ and V is a continuous, concave function on that set. The next step is to define assignment messages and certain related concepts.
Definitions.
The demand correspondence for
4. A collection of sets T is a tree if (1) for any two non-disjoint sets , S S′∈ T , either S S′ ⊂ or S S ′ ⊂ and (2) T contains a largest set -the union of all its elements. That largest set is the root of T.
5. Given a tree of sets T, its extended predecessor function (P) maps each element of T, excluding the root R, into its unique predecessor and maps each j R ∈ into the smallest set S satisfying j S ∈ ∈T .
6. A bound forest is a collection of trees and associated bounds 0 ,..., ( , ) | , 0,...,
. The trees satisfy:
a. The root of 0 T is 0 ( ) R J n = and, for 1,...,
b. For 1,..., k K = , the terminal nodes of tree k T are the singleton sets
c. All bounds except the root bounds are finite, 0 S l ≥ > −∞ and 0 S u ≤ < +∞, but the bounds on the roots may be infinite,
7. An assignment message consists of a collection of bids ( , , , , )
and a bound forest 0 ,..., ( , ) | , 0,...,
8. A basic assignment message is an assignment message with each 1
and with all bounds kS l and kS u integers.
9. An assignment exchange is a mechanism mapping profiles of assignment messages for each bidder n to an outcome pair Proof of Lemma 1. Since π is convex on K ℜ , it is locally Lipschitz and differentiable almost everywhere. By Hotelling's lemma, the demand set is a singleton
at exactly those points of differentiability and
. Substitutability is equivalent to the condition that for 1,..., 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
The indirect profit function is: (7) consists of a sum of submodular functions of ( , )
Since the objective is a sum of submodular functions of ( , ) θ μ , it, too, is a submodular function of ( , ) θ μ . Also, by inspection, each constraint in (7) defines a sublattice of 2 ℜ for some one or two variables among ( , , ) p θ μ and hence of the higher dimensional space of vectors ( , , ) p θ μ . Since an intersection of sublattices is a sublattice, the constraints in (7) define a sublattice.
Thus, (7) takes the form min ( ) z g z subject to ( , ) z p S ∈ where g is submodular and S is a sublattice. Lemma 2 applies, so π is submodular. Lemma 1 then applies, so V is substitutable. QED Proof of Theorem 2. Since the corresponding primal problem can be represented as a continuous concave maximization on a compact set, the maximum exists and coincides with the minimum of the dual. Since the valuations are concave, the set of market-clearing prices is the set of solutions to the dual problem:
Since each n π is continuous and convex, the set of minimizers of the dual problem is closed and convex. Since each n π is submodular, by a theorem of Topkis (1978) , the set of minimizers of the dual problem is a sublattice. QED Proof of Theorem 3. We show something stronger than claimed by the theorem, namely, that there is an integer solution x * to the problem that determines the goods assignments: 
III. Partial Converse to Theorems 1 and 2
The structure of assignment messages allows bidders to report values and effectiveness coefficients without limitations but restricts the form of constraints to be a bound forest. This section shows that if one fails to impose the constraint that 0 n T is a tree, then theorems 1 and 2 become invalid.
The main idea can be illustrated with the example of a buyer for whom the lower bounds l j and l kS are all zero. Suppose that there are three goods and that this buyer has three bids, 1, 2, 3 j = , each with 2.9 j v = and j k j = , all constrained so that 0 2
Suppose that the multi-product groups constraints in the problem are 1 2 3 x x + ≤ and 2 3 3 x x + ≤ , violating the tree structure. Then, for the price vector (0,1,2), the corresponding demand is (2,1,2) and for the price vector (3,1,2), the corresponding demand is (0,2,1): raising the price of good 1 reduces the demand for good 3, violating the substitutes condition. Moreover, if the available quantities are one unit of good 2 and two units each of goods 1 and 3, then the market clears for price vectors (0,1,2) or (2,1,0)
but not for the join, which is (2,1,2), so the set of clearing prices in this example is not a sublattice.
More generally, given any set of constraints 0 n T over goods that fails to have the tree structure, we can find a similar counter-example as follows. Since the constraints do not form a tree, there are two sets, 0 , n S S′∈ T such that each of S S′ − , S S′ ∩ , and S S ′ − are non-empty. Let goods 1, 2 and 3 index goods that are denote elements of these sets and specify that the values of any other goods are zero. Let the bounds constraining these goods be given as in the preceding paragraph and let the bounds on all other constraints be very large, so that those constraints do not bind. These specification reproduce precisely the example of the preceding paragraph for any 0 n T that is not a tree.
That proves the following theorem. 
IV. Tightness
A direct mechanism is a triple ( , , ) means that when other participants are limited to using messages their restricted message space, limiting n to do the same has little or no effect on the set of outcomes that n can bring about. The mechanism ( , , ) N M ω is a tight simplification of ( , , ) ω N M if for all utility profiles ( ) ∈ = n n N u u and every 0 ε ≥ , every pure-strategy profile that is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the simplified mechanism is also an ε-Nash equilibrium of the original, extended mechanism. The Simplification Theorem of Milgrom (2008) asserts that if ( , , ) N M ω has the outcome closure property with respect to ( , , ) ω N M , then the simplification is tight.
For this application, we take ( , ) ω = n n q p , which permits each participant to care about his goods assignment and about the prices, but not the goods assigned to others. In standard equilibrium theory, preferences for a participant n depend only on ( , ) n n q p q ihis goods assignment and payment. By including the price vector in a more general way, the tightness analysis allows that a participant may prefer that its competitor's product commands a low price or that its partner's product commands a high price. It allows that a participant's actual preferences can be any that is acceptable for the Arrow-Debreu theory, but it is not limited to those preferences and certainly not limited to the preferences that are describable using assignment messages.
The next theorem applies not just to the general assignment exchange, but also to mechanisms that limit the messages participants can use to a subset of the assignment If participant n has demand for just one unit in total and acquires a unit of good k, then the additional unit for the coalition of all participants is actually assigned to someone besides n, so k p is the increased optimal value of that unit to the other participants -n's Vickrey price.
Theorem 6. Suppose that some participant n bids to acquire at most one unit in a basic assignment exchange and that the exchange selects the price vector p that is the minimum market-clearing price vector. Then, if n acquires a unit of good k, the price k p is equal to n's Vickrey price for k.
A symmetric statement can be made about participants who sell one unit and exchanges that select the maximum market-clearing price vector.
VI. From Theory to Practice
As described in the introduction, the implementation of multi-product clock auctions can be handicapped by finite bid increments, scheduling issues, and short market periods. The assignment exchange avoids these problems.
The two main practical limitations of assignment exchanges are associated with their enforced simplification of preference messages and the paucity of information they reveal to bidders during the auction. The latter may be significant when there is some common value element in the environment or when a bidder's payoff depends on the trades made by other bidders.
To assess the scope and limits of the assignment message space, it is helpful to begin by studying cases in which simple basic assignment messages can be effective.
Suppose, for example, that an electricity buyer n can purchase power from any of three sources, 1, 2 or 3, subject to transmission costs 1 2 3 ( , , ) t t t and transmission capacity limits In the same setting, it might happen that the buyer has already acquired all of its power need for some time period but would be willing to sell up to β units power at A in exchange for β units at B or C, provided the price is right. This swap can be encoded with three bids and the constraints: 0
encompassed by the theory because it can be expressed using upper and lower bounds:
Swap bids have the potential to add liquidity to an exchange hindered by lack of volume. Investigating this fully is beyond the scope of this paper: it requires a theory of why owners do not constantly participate in and provide liquidity to markets.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in a market with modest liquidity, swaps encourage participation by limiting the risk that one part of an intended transaction might be executed without the other parts. For example, with separate markets, a swapper with a budget limit might have to sell one commodity before buying the other in order to raise funds to transact, leaving the swapper exposed to the risk of not finding a seller for the other part of the planned transaction. By eliminating such risks, swaps make participation safer, increasing liquidity.
The power of simple assignment messages in the examples given above is important because simplicity is often a design goal. One might simplify the general assignment exchange by limiting the number of bids, constraints, or levels in the constraint trees. Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 5 have been constructed to apply even to exchanges that incorporate additional simplifications.
One kind of common constraint that is not fully reflected in theorem 5 arises when the exchange limits a participant's role. For example, only certain parties may be qualified sellers of particular goods, as implemented by a restriction limiting when 0 j l < is permitted. This can be significant for conclusions about tightness, and it is natural to investigate extensions of theorem 5 by imposing similar restrictions on the related Walrasian exchange. I leave that task for others.
Another common limitation imposed by operators is a credit limit on buyers.
Whether this is implemented as a limit on the maximum acceptable bid from a bidder or as a limit on the maximum quantities that can be demanded, the result is simply to restrict the bidder to a subset of the assignment message space, so the theorems continue to apply.
When bidder market power in an auction is alleged, it may be good policy to limit the total quantity of all goods or only of certain goods k purchased by some set of bidders. Such a policy leads to constraints that are complex because they combine bids across bidders. One approach is by product redefinition. For example, if the operator wants to limit bidders 1 and 2 to purchase no more than half of the available units of good 1, it can accomplish that by splitting good 1 into types 1A and 1B and restricting bidders 1 and 2 from bidding on type 1B. This procedure has precedent: it is similar to the setasides used by the US Federal Communications Commission to restrict purchases by incumbents in some auctions.
14 Whether the assignment messages are sufficiently encompassing is likely to vary by application. Certainly, scale economies and complements among lots are sometimes important and cannot generally be solved merely by redefining lots. For example, in electricity, generating plants typically have large fixed costs that require all or nothing decisions about whether to use their power capacity. While such limits are not directly expressed using assignment messages, it is often possible to use the assignment exchange as part of a solution. One ad hoc procedure is to operate the exchange in two or more rounds to allow preliminary price discovery to guide bids at the final round. This does not entirely eliminate the fixed cost problem, but it may sometimes mitigate it. Staged dynamics of this sort may also be helpful when there are important common value elements or when bidders can invest in information gathering during the process, as in Compte and Jehiel (2000) or Rezende (2005) .
A more exact procedure incorporates the assignment exchange as an element within a general combinatorial auction or exchange. For example, participants might be allowed to report fixed costs of transacting in addition to their assignment messages.
Doing that would lead to a two-stage problem, in which finding the right set of participants is a combinatorial optimization problem, but finding the allocation for a 14 The FCC combined this with restrictions on post-auction transfers to limit gaming of the system.
given set of participants is an assignment exchange problem. Similarly, in the airline slot problem, if there is no single time T that is covered by all the relevant intervals, it may still be possible to organize the optimization around a limited number of such times -the combinatorial part of the problem -and to allow the assignment exchange to solve the remaining part.
Three key properties of assignment and basic assignment messages -that they are simple to use and express only substitutable preferences and that basic assignment messages lead to efficient integer solutions -make them potentially valuable for simplifications of other mechanisms in addition to the Walrasian exchange. For example, two principal disadvantages of Vickrey auctions -complexity of the message space and "low" seller revenues (less than in any core allocation) -hinge on either the complexity of the message space and the availability of messages that report non-substitutable values, respectively. 15 A simplified Vickrey auction in which bidders are limited to reporting assignment messages escapes these disadvantages. As another example, consider assignment problems with discrete goods and rules against cash transfers, such as the problems of assigning students to courses or flight attendants to routes. In such cases and assuming that basic assignment messages describe ordinal preferences, by maximizing welfare-weighted sums of assignment values using linear programming, one identifies all and only integer efficient solutions. And, if budget constraints are imposed to find competitive equilibrium solutions, the resulting fractional allocations can be shown to correspond to a randomization over integer solutions.
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As described in the introduction, direct, sealed-bid mechanisms enjoy important advantages compared to ascending or descending auctions, particularly for time-sensitive applications. Assignment exchanges, in particular, are tight, simple to use, fast to execute, and precise in determining both equilibrium prices and goods assignments. Assignment messages provide a compact expression of a useful set of substitutable preferences for a range of applications and the basic assignment messages ensure that equilibrium assignments entail only integer quantities. The assignment exchange design is robust, in the sense that its key properties remain even when the assignment message space is further restricted in any way that does not eliminate any simple assignment messages, and maximal in the sense no extension of the bid tree constraint architecture is possible without destroying the key substitutes property of the message space. In combination, these attributes make the assignment exchange an attractive candidate for the many practical applications in which the goods or items to be assigned are substitutes.
